The European Community\u27s Combat Against Money Laundering: Analysis And Evaluation by Magliveras, Konstantinos D
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMBAT
AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING:
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Konstantinos D. Magliveras*
I. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING .................................. 93
II. THE DIRECTIVE PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERERS FROM
USING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SYSTEM ........ 97
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE IN THE
M EMBER STATES ....................................................... 107
A. The Case of Spain ................................................. 108
B. The Case Of Austria .............................................. 110
IV. OTHER COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES RELATING TO MONEY
LAUNDERING ........................................................... 113
A. The European Police Office (Europol) ........................ 113
B. Relations with Central and Eastern European Countries ... 116
C. The Extradition Convention ..................................... 119
V . CONCLUSIONS .......................................................... 120
I. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN COMBATING
MONEY LAUNDERING
The first concrete reference to money laundering can be traced to the
European Parliament [hereinafter "EP"] Resolution of October 16, 1986.
This Resolution urged the Council of Ministers (the community's main
decision making organ) to adopt promptly an instrument on "concerted
action to tackle the drug problem."' More particularly, the EP urged the
Council of Ministers to introduce effective measures to deal with
laundering of proceeds from narcotics trafficking by, inter alia, adopting a
directive making the reporting of currency transactions compulsory in all
Member States. On October 30, 1986, the Council of Ministers meeting at
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1. Council Resolution on The Drug Problem 1986, 1986 O.J. (C 383) 76; see Bull. Eur.
Communities 10-1986, point 2.4.17.
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the justice ministers level issued a declaration on the drug problem.
However, the declaration did not go as far as the EP's proposal. It only
proposed that practical guidelines be established for freezing and
confiscating the assets of drug traffickers.2
The following year, the European Community [hereinafter "EC"]
participated actively in the preparatory work of the International
Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking [hereinafter "The
Conference"] which was held in Vienna, Austria in June 1987. 3  The
Conference led to the adoption of the Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.4 The Vienna Convention is
primarily concerned with criminalizing narcotics trafficking,' it also
envisages that signatory parties should make the laundering of proceeds
resulting from narcotics a criminal offense. In the Vienna Convention, the
term "money laundering" has been defined in the following two ways:
1. The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that [it has
derived from a drug offense] for the purpose of concealing or
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any
other person who is involved in the commission of [a drug
offense] to evade the legal consequences of his actions; 6 and
2. See Bull. Eur. Communities 10-1986, point 2.4.10.
3. See European Commission Recommendation to the Council Concerning the
Community's Participation and the Action Programme on its Contribution to the Conference,
COM(86)457 final; Bull. Eur. Communities 7/8-1986, point 2.1.113.
4. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
signed in Vienna, Austria, on Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.82/15, [1989] 28 I.L.M. 493,
MISC 14 (1988) CM 804 [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"]. This Convention is a typical
example among contemporary treaties which break away from the traditional rule of international
law that only states may become signatory parties by allowing also regional economic integration
organizations to accede to them. Another example of such a treaty is the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, whose art. 305(l)(t) envisages that any international
organization, which fulfills certain criteria, may sign it. The European Community (EC) did so
on Dec. 7, 1984 and ratified the Law of Sea Convention by virtue of Council Decision 94/562 of
July 25, 1994, 1994 O.J. (L 215) 9.
5. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 3(1). It obliges signatory parties to make
the commission of relevant offenses liable to criminal sanctions, which take into account their
grave nature. Note that the European Community has implemented this provision by adopting the
Council Resolution of Dec. 20, 1996 on Sentencing for Serious Illicit Drug-Trafficking, 1997
O.J. (C 10) 3.
6. Id. at art. 3(1)(b)(ii).
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2. The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source,
location, disposition, movement or ownership of property,
knowing that such property is derived from [a drug] offense.
The Vienna Convention includes a number of provisions aiming at
effective investigation and prosecution of money laundering cases. More
particularly, it provides for extradition between signatory parties in
criminal cases involving money launderers, for mutual legal assistance9
and for the possibility of transferring to another jurisdiction proceedings
for criminal prosecution of alleged money launderers.'0  Finally, the
Convention obliges participating states to take appropriate measures to
facilitate the confiscation of laundered property, which has been
transformed or converted into legitimate assets. To that end, parties must
ensure that national courts are empowered to order the disclosure of bank
records; states may not invoke domestic rules of bank secrecy to avoid
compliance. "
Fresh impetus to the problems posed by the wide-ranging money
laundering activities and the interaction between organized crime and the
banking system was given once again by the EP. In its Resolution of
September 12, 1991, it called upon the European Commission (the
Community's executive organ) to work with national governments to come
up with efficient measures drastically combating organized crime. In
particular, it suggested that in appropriate circumstances, bank secrecy
rules should be lifted in order to control and prevent money laundering.'
2
However, since bank secrecy is an area traditionally associated with state
sovereignty, the EP's call was largely ignored and no concrete action was
taken by the EC.
These sporadic initiatives did not fully address the real problem facing
the EC. The liberalization of the financial sector achieved in the late
7. Id. at art. 3(1)(b)(i).
8. Id. at art. 6. Extradition proceedings between most EC Member States are regulated
by the European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, under the auspices of the Council of
Europe, E.T.S. 24.
9. Id. at art. 7. A basis for mutual assistance is afforded by the European Convention
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Strasbourg, Apr. 20, 1959, 472 UNTS 185, E.T.S.
30. Note that during the 1990s the United States has concluded mutual legal assistance treaties
with the following EC Members: Austria (signed on Feb. 23, 1995, not yet in force),
Luxembourg (signed on Mar. 13, 1997, not yet in force) and the United Kingdom (signed on Jan.
6, 1994, in force since Feb. 12, 1996).
10. Id. at art. 8. The European treaty covering this field is the Convention on Transfer
of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, May 15, 1972, 1137 UNTS 29, under the auspices of the
Council of Europe, E.T.S. 73.
11. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
12. See PARL. EUR. Doc. B3-1393, 1399, 1420 and 1426/91, 1991 O.J. (C 267) 113;
Bull. Eur. Communities 9-1991, point 1.2.134.
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1980's and early 1990's posed complex problems of banking supervision.
13
More importantly, it allowed money launderers to take full advantage of
the new regime, thus endangering the foundations of the Community's
financial sector. The situation became even more complicated, because in
a large number of Member States the notion of money laundering was an
unknown entity. It is true that the criminal law of all Member States does
punish the offense of dishonestly handling stolen goods or goods deriving
from the commission of other crimes or the proceeds of such crimes.14
Although the theoretical construction of money laundering and the handling
of stolen goods share common characteristics, there are fundamental
differences in their nature.' 5
The myriad of issues and difficulties involved in devising an effective
framework for combating money laundering made it imperative that the EC
responded en block and that it was not left to Member States to deal with
money laundering on an individual basis. Although, at the time, the
principle of subsidiarity had not yet been incorporated in the Community
legal order.' 6  However, it has been submitted that money laundering
constitutes a typical example of an area, where legislative action adopted
by the EC can achieve far better results than any action undertaken by each
Member State separately.
The reason for this submission is that money laundering is not a crime
confined within the boundaries of any given country. On the contrary,
money launderers operate as internationally organized players for which
the notion of nation-state is obsolete.' 7 Due to the integration of the world
economy at large and the bringing down of barriers in the EC in particular,
it has been possible for money launderers to organize themselves on a
transnational basis and exploit the financial sectors of those countries. This
13. On the interplay between effective supervision and money laundering, see
KONSTANTINOS MAGLIVERAS, THE ATTEMPTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO INTRODUCE
EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR IN 1996 ONWARDS: LOWERING
THE BARRIERS FURTHER 81, 82 (Caiger & Floudas eds., 1996).
14. E.g. §§ 21-22 Theft Act, 1968, (Eng. & Wales); Larceny Act § 7 (1990) (Ir.); Penal
Code art. 394 (Greece); Penal Code art. 261 (F.R.G.); Penal Code art. 546 (Spain).
15. See Magliveras, supra note 13, at 96-97.
16. It was inserted as art. 3b of the EC Treaty by virtue of art. G(5) of the Treaty
Establishing The European Union [hereinafter "EU Treaty"], Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992). This principle sets out the rule that in those areas which
do not fall within the European Community's exclusive legislative competence, the Community
shall take action only if the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States acting on their own.
17. On global money laundering, see Bruce Zagaris & Shiela M. Castilla, Constructing
an International Financial Enforcement Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-Money-
Laundering Policy, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 872, 874 (1993).
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is because their legal systems, either premeditatedly" or inadvertently,' 9
are unable to halt money laundering operations.2
II. THE DIRECTIVE PREVENTING MONEY LAUNDERERS FROM USING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The concerted response of the European Community to money
laundering came in mid-1991. On June 10, 1991, the Council of Ministers
adopted Directive 91/308 on prevention of the use of the financial system
for the purpose of money laundering.2' Directive 91/308 envisages a
threefold action. First, to ensure that all Member States introduce
legislation, which will make the laundering of proceeds deriving from
serious crimes a criminal offense (Article 2). Second, to devise a system
whereby credit and financial institutions facilitate investigations undertaken
into money laundering operations by the competent national authorities.
This is to be achieved, inter alia, by keeping adequate records of
suspicious transactions, which will then be made available to such
authorities (Articles 3 to 11). Third, to allow Member States to extend the
provisions of Directive 91/308 to all those professions and entities involved
in large cash transactions which are usually carried out undetected, e.g.
dealers in art and in precious stones and metals, real estate agents,
accountants, casinos, bureaux de change and travel agencies. In this way,
it was hoped that the loopholes created by these largely unregulated
businesses will be covered (Article 12).
In Article 1, Directive 91/308 attempts to cover the whole financial
system of the European Community. Therefore, its provisions are not only
applicable to banks but extend to all types of credit and financial
institutions, which are being used or could be used by money launderers.
Credit institutions are defined in accordance with Article 1(1) and (3) of the
First Banking Directive. 22 Financial institutions are very broadly defined:
18. We have in mind those states, which, although they have been severely criticized for
lacking or maintaining lax money laundering legislation, they oppose any amendments to bring
their laws in conformity with international standards; most of the so-called international tax
havens belong to this category.
19. We refer to those states, which for various reasons (e.g. lack of expertise or
resources) are prevented from promulgating the required anti-money laundering legislation.
20. In its report of Feb. 28, 1996, the United Nations International Narcotics Control
Board concluded, inter alia, that criminals take advantage of countries with unregulated or
inadequately supervised financial sectors to move their laundering operations there.
21. Council Directive 91/308, on prevention of the use of the financial system for the
purpose of money laundering, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77. On the legislative history of the Directive,
KONSTANTINOS MAGLIVERAS, MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, IN
BANKS: FRAUD AND CRIME 171, 174-75 (Norton ed., 1994).
22. Council Directive 77/780, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30, as last amended by Council
Directive 89/646 of Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1, (Second Banking Directive). Therefore,
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on the one hand, they comprise undertakings, other than credit institutions,
which have their registered offices inside or outside the European
Community's territory and whose principal activity is to carry out any of
the transactions stipulated in the Annex of the Second Banking Directive;'
on the other hand, they comprise insurance companies duly authorized to
carry out activities in accordance with the relevant Directive. 4
The definition of money laundering is also given in Article 1 and it
becomes immediately clear that it has been heavily influenced by Article
3(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention.' The following intentional acts
constitute the offense of money laundering:
(a) conversion or transfer of property, when it is known that such
property has derived from criminal activities, for the purpose of
concealing or disguising the illegal origin of the property or of
assisting those involved in the carrying out of such activities to
avoid prosecution;
(b) concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location,
disposition or movement of property, although it was known that
the property had derived from the commission of criminal
offenses;
(c) acquisition, possession or use of property, where the
perpetrator was aware, at the time of receipt, that the property
had derived from illicit activities; and
(d) participation or association in attempts to commit, aid, abet,
facilitate or counsel the commission of any of the acts described
above.
The offense of money laundering is also committed when the criminal
operations from where the laundered proceeds originated, were carried out
in the territory of a Member State or third country, different from the state
where prosecution is pursued. The term criminal activity is defined in
Article 1 and has been deliberately drafted in wide terms. It comprises the
offenses specified in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention. The
banks, other entities accepting deposits and offering banking services, and branches of banks
whose registered offices are in a different Member State or in a third country, are covered.
23. See Nos. 2 to 12 and 14 of the Annex to the Second Banking Directive, supra note
22.
24. Council Directive 79/267 of Mar. 5, 1979 O.J. (L 63) 1, (First Life Directive) as last
amended by Council Directive No. 92/96 of Nov. 10, 1992 O.J. (L 360) 1, (Third Life
Directive).
25. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
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definition of criminal activity includes the cultivation, production,
manufacture, transportation and sale of narcotic drugs and the management
or financing of any of these activities, and "any other criminal activity
designated as such for the purposes of this Directive by each Member
State." This wording suggests that Member States are not compelled to
extend the scope of prohibited money laundering operations to proceeds
other than those deriving from drug trafficking offenses (the predicate
offenses).
In this respect, the definition of money laundering has been badly
drafted because it leaves it to the discretion of Member States to decide
which criminal activities should be designated. In effect it allows for
considerable disparities between national legislation. One consequence of
this disparity could be seen in cases of extradition: if Member State A
requests from Member State B the extradition of C for alleged laundering
of funds derived from terrorist activities and the laws of Member State B
criminalize only the laundering of drug trafficking proceeds, the request
shall be turned down, because the principle of double criminality (i.e. that
the act for which extradition is petitioned must be a criminal offense in
both Member States)26 would not be fulfilled. It would have been better, if
a minimum catalogue of predicate offenses had been included in Directive
91/308, possibly covering drug trafficking, terrorism, tax evasion, loan
sharking, illegal gambling and prostitution, and Member States had been
left free to add to that list.
Directive 91/308 has a stipulation that money launderers may only be
prosecuted if they were aware that the property given to them for
conversion derived from committing or participating in a predicate
offense. 27 This places an additional obstacle to successfully bringing before
the courts money laundering cases. This is because prosecutors bear the
onus of proving that the launderers had concrete knowledge of the
property's illicit origin.28 It should be stressed that Directive 91/308's
strict requirement that the alleged money laundering operations must have
been intentional in order to be prosecuted has not been followed by all
Member States. Thus, the implementing legislation adopted in the
Netherlands, 29 Ireland30  and Britain3' also punish negligent money
26. In Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903), the United States Supreme Court
stated that "the general principle of international law is that in all cases of extradition the act done
on account of which extradition is demanded must be considered a crime by both states." This
rule has been incorporated as art. 2(1) of the European Convention on Extradition, supra note 5.
27. C. Art. 3(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 4.
28. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5(7) (urging signatory parties to consider
reversing the burden of proof regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds liable to
confiscation).
29. Penal Code art. 417 bis (Neth.); see Konstantinos Magliveras, The Implementation of
the 1991 EC Directive on Money Laundering in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, 8 INT'L L.
PRACTICUM OF THE N.Y. B.A. 89, 95-96 (1995).
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laundering. In other words, cases where the defendant ought to have
suspected that the proceeds whose identity he disguised had derived from
the commission of a predicate offense.
A further difficulty with which prosecutors in Member States are
faced is that they must link the illicit proceeds to a specific crime. This is
particularly true in the case of drug trafficking offenses, which are usually
committed many times in the course of a single day. As early as 1988, the
British Metropolitan Police maintained that the fact that the prosecution had
to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the laundered money had been
the proceeds of drug trafficking resulted in considerable difficulties, not
only in conducting in-depth investigations but also in securing convictions
for money laundering offenses. 2
Similar obstacles exist in relation to confiscation orders. The position
of the British law exemplifies how a Member State had to amend its
legislation to overcome these difficulties. Under the Criminal Justice Act
1988, confiscation orders could have only concerned proceeds derived
from the offense for which the defendant was convicted. It followed, that
proceeds of crimes, the defendant was not charged with could have never
been the object of a confiscation order. With the promulgation of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, the British legislator changed this state of
affairs: section 2(4) of the 1995 Act now empowers courts to make the
assumption that all property held by the defendant at the time of conviction
is perceived as proceeds of the offense charged with.33
Article 2 of the Money Laundering Directive proved to be quite
controversial, because its original wording insisted that Member States
"ensure that money laundering is treated as a criminal offense."3 4 At one
point, this provision jeopardized the adoption of the whole directive by the
Council of Ministers.35 The dispute at issue was whether the European
Community enjoys any legislative power in the area of criminal law. This
was not the first time that an EC instrument falling within the broad area of
criminal law proved to be controversial. For example, in 1987 a proposal
was put forward for a directive harmonizing insider dealing across the
Community. 36  This Directive required that insider dealing should be
30. Criminal Justice Act § 93A(l)(1988); see Konstantinos Magliveras, The Regulation of
Money Laundering in the Republic of Ireland, 11 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 82, 83 (1995).
31. Criminal Justice Act § 93A(1)(1988)(Eng.), § 93A(l)(1998)(Eng.), inserted by virtue
of Criminal Justice Act, § 29(1993)(Eng.).
32. See House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Session 1988-89, Seventh
Report, Drug Trafficking and Related Serious Crime, Vol. I, para. 79, H.C. 370.
33. See Konstantinos Magliveras, Extending Further the Powers of Confiscation in
Britain: The Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, 13 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 8, 9 (1997).
34. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
35. See Magliveras, supra note 21, at 178-79.
36. COM(87) 111 final, 1987 O.J. (C 153) 8.
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treated as a criminal offense. The uncompromising position of Germany
led to the amendment of the relevant provision (Article 13) to the following
wording: "Each Member State shall determine penalties to be applied for
infringement of the measures taken pursuant to this Directive. ,31
A similar compromise was reached in the Money Laundering
Directive and Article 2 was changed to read: "Member States shall ensure
that money laundering as defined in this Directive is prohibited." In order
to compensate for this watered-down provision, the European Community
partners gave the undertaking that their implementing legislation would
make money laundering a criminal offense by December 31, 1992.38
Article 2 of the Money Laundering Directive was supplemented by
two new provisions, which did not appear in the original proposal.39 The
first is Article 14, whose wording is identical to Article 13 of the Insider
Dealing Directive.' This Directive obliges Member States to determine
the penalties to be imposed in case the measures adopted under the
Directive are infringed upon. The second is Article 15, which empowers
Member States to promulgate against money launderers measures stricter
than those envisaged in the Directive.4'
During the deliberations for the adoption of the Money Laundering
Directive, the EP proposed that Article 2 should have also obliged Member
States to ensure that all proceeds from criminal activities were subject to
confiscation. This view was not shared by the Council of Ministers. The
EP amendment considerably altered the scope of the Directive, which aims
only at preventing money launderers from exploiting the European
Community's integrated financial system for their benefit. It follows that
the Directive was not conceived as an instrument facilitating confiscation of
illicit proceeds. Currently, this may only be achieved under specific
37. Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30., coordinating regulations on insider
dealing. The German position has consistently been that insider dealing should not be
criminalized. See Engel, Zur Problematic eines gesetzliches Verbots von Insider-Geschaeften, 3
JAHRBUCH FLIER SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT 338 (1991). It was finally outlawed under the Securities
Trading Act (Gesetz ueber den Wertpapierhandel) of July 26, 1994, published in
Bundesgesetzblatt (German Official Gazette), Part I, at 1749. See ASSMAN, THE PROPOSED
GERMAN LEGISLATION ON INSIDER DEALING IN INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE:
CURRENT STATUS 15 (Wegen ed., 1994).
38. The undertaking took the form of a declaration of intent, attached to the text of the
Directive, supra note 21. Note that the European Parliament has argued that because of the
importance of the organized crime problem, the fight against it should become a matter of
exclusive Community competence. See European Parliament Resolution on Criminal Activities in
Europe, PARL. EUR. DoC. A3-0033/94; 1994 O.J. (C 61) 235.
39. See Commission Proposal on a Directive to Curb Money Laundering, COM(90)106
final, 1990 O.J. (C 106)6; 2 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 411 (1990).
40. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
41. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
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treaties, such as the Vienna Convention,42 the Council of Europe
Convention on Laundering, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of
Crime4 3 and the Schengen Implementing Agreement."
Articles 3 through 7 of the Money Laundering Directive contain the
measures, which Member States must impose on credit and financial
institutions operating in their jurisdiction.4" Article 3(1) provides that such
institutions must proceed with customer identification when an account is
opened or a transaction is carried out exceeding, in local currency, the
amount of ECU 15,000 ($ 13,650) either in a single operation or in
separate operations, appearing to be loosely connected (the so-called
smurfing) . In practice, the identification requirement is implemented
when banks check in detail the identity of customers (the so-called know
your customer principle) and refrain from opening anonymous4" or proxy
accounts where the beneficiary's identity is not fully revealed.The identification requirement also extends to insurance companies.
Article 3(3) and (4) exclude from its application those insurance policies
whose periodic premiums, in any given year, do not exceed ECU 1,000 ($
1,350) or whose lump sum investment amounts to ECU 2,500 ($ 3,375) or
less, or insurance policies of occupational pension schemes.48 These limits
have been set at rather low levels and that provision ought to have been
made to index-link these amounts to inflation, which in certain Member
States is not inconsiderable. Finally, Article 3(8) stipulates that the
identification requirement is fulfilled, if payment of the insurance policy is
effected through an account held in the customer's name and in a credit
institution covered by the Directive. This provision could have been
problematic at the time the Directive was adopted. However, because
supervision in the financial sector was not properly harmonized across the
42. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
43. The Convention was concluded in Strasbourg, France on Nov. 8, 1990, in force since
Sept. 1, 1993, E.T.S. 141, at articles 13-17; reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991). Twenty-seven
states have signed it, but only thirteen have ratified it; the United Kingdom was the first country
to ratify it on Sept. 28, 1992, 1993 Gr. Brit.T.S. No. 59 (Cmnd. 2337).
44. The Agreement was signed in Schengen, Luxembourg on June 19, 1990, in force
since March 26, 1995, [1991], at an. 72; 30 I.L.M. 84. It supersedes the Convention on the
Gradual Abolition of Checks at the Common Borders of France, the Federal Republic, Belgium,
The Netherlands and Luxembourg of June 14, 1985 (the so-called Schengen Convention), [1991]
30 I.L.M. 73. See generally O'Keefe, The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for European
Integration? 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 185 (1992).
45. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
46. Id.
47. On Austria's insistence to maintain anonymous accounts, see infra at 108-111.
48. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
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European Community, the situation has been undoubtedly improved with
the entry into force in July 1996, of the so-called Post-BCCI Directive.49
Article 6 of the Money Laundering Directive imposes a duty on credit
and financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to the competent
national judicial or law enforcement authorities. However, it was agreed
not to adopt a general reporting requirement similar to the one, which has
been imposed in the United States since 1970.50 The United States
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 requires banks
to file a report (CTR) with the Treasury Department within 15 days after a
customer deposits, withdraws or transfers currency in excess of $10,000,
regardless of whether the transaction was of a suspicious nature. 1
Undoubtedly, the Directive's drafters had a lot to learn from the
application of the United States regulations, especially in relation to
smurfing. Courts have held that the 1970 Act did not prohibit the
structuring of banking transactions to multiple operations involving
amounts less than $10,000 in order to avoid the CTR filing requirement.52
This lacuna was not closed until the Money Laundering Control Act was
promulgated in 1986;51 it enacted the so-called anti-smurfing statute, which
provides that "no person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting
requirements, structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure any
transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions."'54
The United States legislation has been notably followed in Australia,
where section 7 of the Cash Transaction Reports Act 1988 (in operation
49. European Parliament and Council Directive No. 95/26 of June 29, 1995 amending
Directives 77/780/EEC and 89/646/EEC in the field of credit institutions, Directives No.
73/239/EEC and 92/49/EEC in the field of non-life insurance, Directives Nos. 79/267/EEC and
92/96/EEC in the field of life insurance, Directive No. 93/22/EEC in the field of investment
firms and Directive No. 85/611/EEC in the field of undertakings for collective investment in
transferable securities, with a view to reinforcing prudential supervision, 1995 I.J. L 168) 7. For
examination of this Directive, see Magliveras, supra note 13, at 83-96.
50. Note that Taiwan's Money Laundering Control Act of Oct. 23, 1996 in force since
April 23, 1997, has opted for the EC suspicion-based reporting system rather than the U.S. one;
see Lee, Recent Anti-Money-Laundering Efforts in Taiwan, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 140,
143-44 (1998).
51. Commonly referred to by the misnomer Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84
Stat. 1118, (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1994)), in particular §
5313(A). On the problems created by the vast number of CTRs (estimated to have reached over
100 million by the end of 1997). See Byrne, Bank Secrecy Act Compliance in the 1990's, 179
BANKERS MAO. 15 (1996).
52. See United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1309 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1004 (1989); United States v Mastronardo, 849 F.2d 799, 804 (3d Cir. 1988); United States
v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1987).
53. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957
(1994)).
54. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994).
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since July 1990 and amended by Part II of the Crimes Legislation
Amendment Act 1992) has introduced a rather low threshold amount
requiring banks, credit unions, casinos, etc. to report cash transactions
over Ash 10,000 ($6,650) to the Australian Transaction Reports and
Analysis Centre (formerly, the Cash Transaction Reporting Agency).
Section 31 of the 1988 Act creates the offense of smutfing and already
there have been a number of prosecutions. It is interesting to note that in
the first case of successful prosecution, the accused was not a bank
customer, but the manager of a foreign bank's Sydney representative
office, whose staff had itself developed a system to enable certain clients to
engage in smurfing.5"
Although the system of compulsory reporting of all transactions
involving a minimum amount has not been particularly effective in
detecting money-laundering operations in the banking sector, certain
countries have recently adopted it. More specifically, section 4 of
Bahamas' Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act 1995 stipulates
reporting requirements similar to those imposed on United States financial
institutions.5 In addition, Articles 11 through 13 of the 1998 Brazilian Bill
on Money Laundering obligate home banks and representative offices of
foreign financial institutions to report transactions above a certain threshold
to the national Financial Activities Control Board.57
Article 6 of the Money Laundering Directive also obliges credit and
financial institutions to furnish the competent authorities of a Member State
with all requested information, documents or records and to assist them in
their criminal investigations into money laundering cases.5s  Since
furnishing such information results in bank secrecy being lifted, this may
possibly lead to a breach of contract by the forwarding institution. Article
9(2) stipulates that any such disclosure, done in good faith to the competent
authorities, shall not involve civil or penal responsibility of any kind on the
part of the institution or its employees that disclosed the sensitive
information.59
55. See Hammond & Waldie, Money Laundering: Foreign Banks Beware, INT'L FIN. L.
REv., May 1996, at 49.
56. See Gibson, Bahamas Money Laundering Regulations 1996, 13 INT'L ENFORCEMENT
L.REP. 1 (1997). The Bahamas was the first offshore financial center to enact legislation against
money laundering.
57. Law No. 9613 of Mar. 3, 1998. See Bruce Zagaris & Sardenberg, Brazil Enacts
Anti-Money - Laundering Law, 14 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 136, 138-39 (1998).
58. Council Directive No. 91/308, supra note 21.
59. Cy. Post-BCCI Directive, supra note 49, at art. 5. It provides that when an auditor
reveals irregularities in the audited company to the competent authorities and thus violates his duty
of professional secrecy, such disclosures shall not constitute a breach of restrictions on disclosure
of information imposed by contract or any legislative or administrative provision and shall not
involve liability of any kind.
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During the Directive's drafting stages, the EP proposed two
amendments to the system of reporting suspicious transactions, which were
accepted by the Council of Ministers. The first, incorporated as Article 8,
ensures that banks will not disclose to their customers the fact that
information relating to their transactions has been requested and transmitted
to judicial authorities or that a money laundering investigation is being
carried out and that their names are in some way implicated in it (the so-
called tipping off).
The second amendment, incorporated as Article 6(3), imposes an
obligation upon the competent authorities not to use the information
released in accordance with this provision for purposes other than
investigations into money laundering operations. A similar provision can
be found in Article 10(3) of the Insider Dealing Directive, preventing the
competent authorities from using the information received in any other
context apart from administrative or judicial proceedings against insider
traders. 6
In Article 10, the Money Laundering Directive calls for cooperation
between the various competent authorities of a Member State. However,
the exact structure of such cooperation is to be decided by each state
individually. The exception is that if inspections have been carried out in
credit or financial institutions by competent supervisory authority6' and
they reveal evidence of possible laundering operations, it must be passed
on to the judicial or law enforcement authorities responsible for combating
money laundering. In the United Kingdom this obligation has been
implemented in Regulation 16 of the Money Laundering Regulations
1993 .6 This regulation places a legal duty upon the supervisory authorities
to disclose to the police as soon as practically possible any information
collected by them indicating money-laundering operations.
Unfortunately, the Directive's drafters did not include a provision
allowing the competent authorities in one Member State to request the
transmission of information from another Member State relating to money
laundering investigations.6 This possibility would have ensured the fullest
cooperation and assistance between the competent authorities in all Member
States by exchanging vital information regarding money launderers who
operate across borders. The lack of such a provision is rather curious
60. See supra note 37. Enumerating in a restrictive fashion in which cases confidential
information collected by or exchanged between banking supervisory authorities may be used and
for what purpose.
61. In EC law, the principle is that supervision is exercised solely by the competent
authorities of the state which first authorized the institution to pursue business, the so-called
"home country principle;" see Second Banking Directive, supra note 24, at art. 13.
62. Statutory Instruments No. 1993/1933.
63. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 21.
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considering that such requests are possible under Article 10(1)-(2) of the
Insider Dealing Directive.'
As the situation now stands, such assistance can be afforded either in
the context of an official request pursuant to a bilateral mutual legal
assistance treaty' s or in accordance with the provisions of the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters' or the Council of
Europe Convention on Laundering. 67
Article 10 of the latter treaty empowers one signatory party to forward
to another party, without prior request, information on proceeds from
illegal activities when it considers that, by disclosing such information, the
receiving state might be assisted in initiating or carrying out investigations
or prosecuting money launderers.6 It should be noted that this provision
does not give rise to a binding obligation. In other words, signatory parties
are entitled to exercise their discretion in deciding whether such
information should be transmitted to another state. Taking into
consideration that the Convention could be acceded to by non-Council of
Europe Members, namely Australia, Canada and the United States,' the
prospects which this provision opens for effective international cooperation
are enormous, should states be prepared to implement it with an open
mind. 7
0
Although it has been argued that this was the first time that a
multilateral treaty has envisaged such wide-ranging cooperation between
signatory parties,71 this submission is not accurate. Article 46(1) of the
Schengen Implementing Agreement had already stipulated that "In
particular cases, each Contracting Party may, in compliance with its
national law and without being asked, send the Contracting Party
64. See supra note 37. In Germany this provision has been implemented under paragraph
14 of the Securities Trading Act.
65. E.g. Agreement between UK and Italy concerning mutual assistance in relation to
traffic in narcotic drugs and the restraint and confiscation of the proceeds of crime, signed in
Rome, Italy, on May 16, 1990, in force since May 8, 1994. 1995 Gr. Brit.T.S. No. 33 (Cmnd.
2853).
66. See supra note 9.
67. See supra note 43.
68. Id.
69. This reflects the fact that these three countries participated actively in the
Convention's drafting; so far, only Australia has signed it, on Sept. 28, 1992.
70. See the Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to Supplement
and Facilitate the Operation of the Convention of the Council of Europe on Laundering, signed in
London, on Sept. 15, 1993, in force since June 2, 1994. 1994 Gr. Brit.T.S. 45 (Cmnd. 2655).
71. See Nilsson, The Council of Europe Laundering Convention: A Recent Example of a
Developing International Criminal Law in Principles and Procedures for a New Transnational
Criminal Law, 457, 472 (Eser & Lagodny eds., 1993).
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concerned any information which may be of interest to it in helping prevent
future crime.'
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE IN THE MEMBER STATES
According to Article 16, the European Community partners had to
implement the Money Laundering Directive into their internal legal orders
by January 1, 1993 at the latest. However, this deadline was not observed
by the majority of Member States. It is interesting to note that even
countries which had promulgated relevant legislation before the Directive
was adopted failed to achieve complete implementation by the stipulated
deadline. For example, in Britain where the laundering of proceeds from
drug trafficking was made a criminal offense in 1986, ' the Directive was
fully incorporated into national law by virtue of the Criminal Justice Act of
1993'4 and the Money Laundering Regulations of 1993.' 5 Similarly, in
Belgium, where the Act of July 17, 1990, introduced to its Penal Code
Article 505 creating the offense of intentional or negligent laundering of
proceeds of any crime,76 the Directive was finally given effect by the
Money Laundering Act of January 11, 1993. 77
Although it is not within the scope of the present article to analyze
how the Directive was turned into domestic legislation in each and every
Member State, reference will be made to specific problems, which have
been encountered. The method of implementation opted for by most
Member States in Continental Europe has been to amend their Penal Codes
in order to criminalize money laundering and to promulgate separate
legislation catering for the substantive provisions of the Directive (e.g. the
identification requirement, the obligation to reveal to the competent
authorities all suspicious transactions and the duty not to alert customers
suspected of money laundering). This method was followed, inter alia, by
Germany where the 1992 Act on impeding illegal drug trafficking and
other forms of organized crime introduced a new paragraph 261 to the
72. The Agreement, supra note 44, was concluded three months before the Council of
Europe Convention on Laundering, supra note 43.
73. See Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986 § 24 (Eng.). It was later replaced by the
Drug Trafficking Act, 1994 § 50 (Eng.).
74. The Act received the Royal Assent on July 27, 1993.
75. See supra note 62.
76. Loi du 17 julliet 1990, modifiant les arts. 42, 43 et 505 du Code penal et inserant un
art. 43bis dans ce meme Code (F90-2020), published in Moniteur Beige (Belgian Official
Gazette), Aug. 15 1990, at 15886.
77. Loi du 11 janvier 1993 relative a la prevention d I'utilisation du systeme financier aux
fins du blanchiment de capitaux, published in Moniteur Beige, Jan. 28, 1993. These two statutes
were amended by the Act of Apr. 7, 1995, published in Moniteur Beige, May 10, 1995 which
inserted a new art. 505(4) to the Penal Code expressly punishing attempted money laundering.
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Penal Code78 and the 1993 Act on the detection of proceeds from serious
crimes incorporated the substantive provisions.'
In the case of the Netherlands, the Dutch Penal Code was amended
with effect on February 1, 1992, to criminalize intentional (Article 416) or
negligent (Article 417bis) acceptance, possession or transfer of property
(including money) which has been obtained by committing any felony. 8°
The substantive provisions were implemented by the adoption of two
separate pieces of legislation: the Identification (Financial Services) Act
1993 and the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (Financial Services) Act
1993, both of which came into force on 1 February 1994.1
This method of implementation could be considered as advantageous,
in the sense that it allows Member States to adopt detailed and precise
legislation. However, it has the disadvantage of not being able to tackle
the problem effectively should the various pieces of legislation prove to be
incoherent with each other. The gist of the Directive is that the panacea of
money laundering is not addressed by simply ensuring that it is made a
criminal offense; this is only one of the required measures. Equally
important is the assistance afforded by many different players: law
enforcement agencies, financial institutions, supervisory authorities, etc.
Only the concerted effort of the legislature and these players ensures that
the money-laundering problem is efficiently tackled.
A. The Case of Spain
This argument is best illustrated by examining the shortcomings of the
Directive's implementation in Spain. Organic Law 1/1988 of March 24,
1988, reforming the Penal Code in relation to illegal drug-trafficking
introduced Article 546bis(f), which penalized the laundering of proceeds
derived from dealing in drugs. 82  A first attempt to incorporate the
Directive's substantive provisions was the promulgation, on December 28,
78. Gesetz zur Bekaempfung des illegalen Rauschgifthandels und anderer
Erscheinungsformen der organisierten Kriminalitaet of July 15, 1992, published in
Bundesgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 34, July 27, 1992, at 1302; see Magliveras, supra note 29, at 90 et
seq.
79. Gesetz ueber das Aufspueren von Gewinnen aus schweren Straftaten
(Geldwaeschegesetz) of Oct. 25, 1993, published in Bundesgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 56, Oct. 29,
1993, at 1770.
80. See Magliveras, supra note 29, at 95.
81. Respectively, Wet identificatie bij fmanciele dienstverlening and Wet melding
ongebruikelijke transacties both of Feb. 2, 1993, published in the Dutch Official Gazette, 1992-
93, Nos. 23008 and 23009, respectively.
82. Published in Boletin Oficial del Estado (Spanish Official Gazette, B.O.E.), Mar. 26,
1988, No. 74, at 9498. Its scope was subsequently widened by Organic Law No. 8/1992 of Dec.
23, 1992, published in B.O.E., Dec. 24, 1992, No. 308.
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1993 of Act 19/1993, on Offenses Relating to the Laundering of Moneys.83
Since this instrument did not implement the Directive fully, a provision was
made whereby the government was granted six months from the day the
Act entered into force (i.e. until June 28, 1994) to adopt the necessary
supplementary legislation. However, this deadline was not observed and,
in effect, Spain was faced with a situation where only some aspects of the
anti-money laundering legislation were in place. The supplementary
legislation was finally promulgated on June 9, 1995, as Royal Decree
925/1995.' 4
This plethora of instruments regulating the same area has resulted in
unavoidable contradictions. As already mentioned, Article 564bis(f) of the
Penal Code criminalizes the laundering of proceeds deriving solely from
drug trafficking. Whereas the scope of Act 19/1993 has been augmented
to cover not only drug trafficking proceeds, but also proceeds from
criminal activities perpetrated by terrorists or by organized crime groups.
It follows that although a person who launders proceeds from an armed
attack on a security van carried out by terrorists may not be prosecuted
under the Penal Code, a bank manager who failed to report a transaction
for which there was evidence or knowledge that constituted an operation to
launder proceeds from the armed attack will be prosecuted under Act
19/1993. This divergence between the two instruments, which had been
acknowledged by the Spanish government," was rectified in Article 301 of
the new Penal Code.86
It would be untrue to argue this state of affairs paralyzed the Spanish
law enforcement agencies. The argument made here is that, until Royal
Decree 925/1995 was promulgated, Spanish law was not in a position to
deal, in a drastic manner, with money laundering operations. It is
interesting to note the money laundering operations which have been
unveiled by the Spanish police were not discovered as a result of the
legislation's application but by reason of the arrest of the drug traffickers,
83. Ley 19/1993, de 28 de diciembra, sobre determinadas medidas de prevencion del
blanquero de capitales published in B.O.E., Dec. 29, 1993, No. 311, at 37327.
84. Published in B.O.E., June 9, 1995, No. 160 and corrected in B.O.E., Oct. 31, 1995,
No. 260. The Decree, inter alia, provides the complete list of entities whose activities are
covered by the money laundering legislation (art. 2); stipulates in which cases the identification
requirement does not apply (art. 4); sets out the functions of and the procedure before the
Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offenses, the competent
authority to receive notification of suspicious transactions (arts. 19-26); and amends the penalties
imposed for money laundering offenses (art. 16).
85. See Konstantinos Magliveras, The Recent Legislation to Combat Money Laundering
in Spain, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 84, 85 (1996).
86. It was promulgated by the Spanish Parliament on Nov. 8, 1995 and published in
B.O.E., Nov. 24, 1995, No. 281, in force since May 24, 1996; see generally Mir, Das neue
spanische Strafgesetzbuch von, 108 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER DIE GESAMTE STRAFWISSENSCHAFT 857
(1996).
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who revealed how the proceeds were laundered.87  The most spectacular
prosecution occurred in October 1995, when four individuals were accused
of laundering two billion pesetas ($13 million) between 1988 and 1991,
which had derived from drug trafficking. The method of laundering was a
very simple one: they exchanged in a specific bank the narcotics proceeds,
held in Italian liras and Dutch florins, into pesetas."5
B. The Case Of Austria
The implementation of the Money Laundering Directive has not only
been problematic for the existing Member States, but also for countries
which acceded to the European Community after it was adopted. The case
of Austria affords a very good illustration and shows that, notwithstanding
the deep integration of the European Community's banking sector, there
still exist considerable differences regarding banking ethics. As a signatory
party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area 9 and to the Treaty
of Nordic and Austrian Accession, under which she became a Member
State on January 1, 1995, 9' Austria was under an obligation to transform
the Money Laundering Directive into national law. Implementation was
achieved on July 30, 1993, with the promulgation of the Penal Code
(Money Laundering) Act 1993. 9'
The Act introduced the offense of money laundering in paragraph
165(1) of the Austrian Penal Code. It stipulates that anyone who conceals
valuables in excess of ASh 100,000 ($7,900) obtained through a crime or
who disguises their illicit origin or makes untrue statements in respect of
them is to be punished with a maximum term of imprisonment of two years
or with a pecuniary penalty.' Paragraph 165(3) deals with money
laundering operations involving more than ASh 500,000 ($39,500) or
carried out by members of criminal groups which were established with the
87. See Spanish Police Strike Against Drug-Related Laundering, 13 INT'L ENFORCEMENT
L.REP. 90 (1997).
88. See Spanish Drug Prosecutor Seeks First Closure of Bank for Money Laundering, 11
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 479 (1995).
89. Signed in Oporto, Portugal on May 2, 1992, in force since Jan. 1, 1994, 1994 O.J.
(L 1) 3.
90. Signed in Corfu, Greece on June 24, 1994, in force since Jan. 1, 1995, 1994 O.J. (C
241) 9; see article 2 of the attached Austrian Act of Accession, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 21. The
legislative changes to Austria's financial services sector brought about by its accession are
summarized in Huber and Luiki, Austria - Major Changes in Financial and Securities Laws
Prompted by New EC Era [1995] 2 Eur. Fin. Serv. L. 35.
91. Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Strafgesetzbuch im - Zusammenhang mit der
Geldwaescherei geaendert wird, No. 527, published in Bundesgesetzblatt fuer Oesterreich
(Austrian Official Gazette), No. 192, July 30, 1993, at 3885, in force since Oct. 1, 1993; on the
Draft Act, see Kienapfel, Die Geldwaescherei [1993] 48 Oesterreichische Juristen Zeitung 80.
92. Id.
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purpose of continuously laundering illicit proceeds; these offenses attract
the heavier punishment of a term of imprisonment between six months and
five years.' The lack of the possibility to impose a pecuniary penalty on
money launderers involved in such cases should be criticized, because, as
consistent practice has shown, it is not always possible for the prosecution
to detect the physical location of the laundered funds so as to proceed with
their seizure. In these instances, the imposition of a heavy penalty results,
at least partially, in skimming the convicted launderer of his illicit gains.
Since 1996, Austria has been involved in a bitter dispute with the
European Commission on whether its banking laws comply with the
requirements of the Money Laundering Directive. The issue of the dispute
is the fact that the Austrian legislation, unique among Member States,
allows the opening and holding of anonymous savings accounts, known as
Sparbuch Kontos.' On February 15, 1996, the Commission forwarded a
formal complaint warning the Austrian government that, by not ensuring
the proper identification of individuals opening savings accounts, it had
failed to comply with its obligations under the Directive. The Commission
concluded its communication with requesting Austria to proceed
immediately with abolishing all such anonymous accounts.9 The European
Commission has not been alone in severely criticizing Austria in this
respect. A 1995 United States government report on the vulnerability of
the world banking system to money laundering ranked Austria's banking
sector alongside those of Colombia, Venezuela and Thailand because of its
potential for abuse by money launderers.'
On April 9, 1996, Austria flatly rejected the Commission's complaint.
Reflecting the strong nationalist reaction, which this issue provoked, Mr.
Klaus Liebscher, the Central Bank president, characteristically said that
anonymous savings accounts "are part of the Austrian savings culture
[which] should not be touched."' In its response, Austria insisted that
these accounts be maintained on the following considerations. 9' First, the
Austrian Constitution guarantees bank secrecy and domestic legislation
provides for adequate guarantees that bank secrecy will be lifted in the
93. Laundering the proceeds of a criminal organization at its request is regulated in
Article 278a of the Austrian Penal Code and is punishable with a term of imprisonment of
between six months and five years.
94. The Commission has estimated that Austria's population of eight million maintains
some 26 million such savings accounts holding approximately ASh 1,4 trillion ($ 110 billion).
95. Zagaris, Austria Will Restrict Bank Secrecy Laws on Securities, But Not Savings
Accounts, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.REP. 88 (1996).
96. See Austria: Controversy over Austrian Anonymity Rules, CLIFFORD CHANCE EUR.
FIN. SERv. NEWSLETTER, Mar. 1996, at 1.
97. See Fuchs, Gewinnabschoepfung und Geldwaescherei Wie soil es weitergehen? [1995]
50 OESTERREICHISCHE JURISTEN ZEITUNG 215.
98. Id.
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event of criminal investigations.' Second, bank accounts have been held
anonymously in Austria for 200 years. Third, these accounts may only be
opened by Austrian citizens and the maximum amount held in them cannot
exceed ASh 200,000 ($15,800). Therefore, they are not of particular
assistance to money launderers who are mostly engaged in transferring
considerably larger amounts. Fourthly, although during 1995 Austrian
banks reported 310 cases of suspected money laundering transactions, with
a volume of ASh 2.5 billion ($197 million), only a handful of these
involved savings accounts. o
As was expected, the European Commission was not at all impressed
by the argumentation put forward by Austria and especially by the
submission that a different banking culture has existed for so long, which
should be taken into consideration. Consequently, in September 1996, the
Commission addressed Austria in another communication stating its view
that the rule of anonymity in opening savings accounts is incompatible with
the identification requirement enshrined in Article 3(1) of the Directive °1
and that the continued existence of such accounts offers a safe haven for
illicit funds." The gist of the Commission's communication was that the
current Austrian legislation infringes upon not only European, but also
common international standards on the prevention of money laundering to
which all countries are expected to subscribe.
Austria's uncompromising position on its bank secrecy laws led the
Commission to commence the infringement proceedings envisaged in
Article 169 of the EC Treaty.0 3 Thus, in March 1997, it sent a Reasoned
Opinion to the Austrian government where it recorded the alleged
violations of the Money Laundering Directive and gave Austria final
opportunity to have its anonymous bank accounts abolished. In April
1997, the Austrian government rejected the Commission's contentions and
99. Id.
100. According to paragraph 40(1) of the Austrian Banking Act 1993 (Bankwesengesetz)
published in Bundesgesetzblatt, July 30, 1993, No. 194, at 3903, when banks suspect money
laundering operations, they are under the duty to establish the customer's identity and
communicate promptly their suspicions to the law enforcement authorities. The latter are
empowered under paragraph 40(3) to demand that the bank does not carry out the suspicious
transaction until authorization to do so has been granted. This power has been strongly criticized
because it infringes customers' rights without the legislation expressly authorizing it. See Fuchs,
supra note 97.
101. See supra, at note 21.
102. See CLIFFORD CHANCE EUR. FIN. SERV. NEWSLErrER, Sept. 1996, at 1-2.
103. This provision reads as follows: "If the Commission considers that a Member State
has failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State
concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the
latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice."
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refused to comply with its request.t " The next step in the infringement
proceedings is for the Commission to lodge an application before the
European Court of Justice asking for a declaration that Austria has violated
its obligations under the EC Treaty."os
It has been reported that on October 15, 1997 the European
Commission decided to refer the case to the European Court of Justice.'06
The Commission's case is based on two considerations. " First, that the
retention of anonymous savings accounts is a flagrant breach of the
principle of identification cornerstone of the Money Laundering
Directive.0 Second, that the offense of money laundering applies only if
the laundered proceeds exceed the threshold amount of ASh 100,000
contravenes the Money Laundering Directive, which contains no such
threshold. Although it is an undisputed reality that the judgments of the
European Court can only rarely be predicted, it is submitted that Austria's
position will not be vindicated. This is because the European Community's
financial sector is so deeply integrated that no Member State could be
permitted to maintain contradictory legislation. This is so, even though
there are no clear cases suggesting that these anonymous savings account
are being consistently used for money laundering operations in Austria.
IV. OTHER COMMUNITY ACTIvITIEs RELATING To MONEY LAUNDERING
A. The European Police Office (Europol)
In July 1995, the Council of Ministers drew up the Convention setting
up EUROPOL. 1" Before examining what powers EUROPOL has been
conferred in dealing with money laundering, it is worthwhile to refer
briefly to EUROPOL's predecessors, namely the Trevi Group and the
European Drugs Unit (hereinafter "EDU"). For a substantial number of
years Member States had collaborated on an ad hoc basis on a string of
104. See Poech, The Anonymous Bank Account and Recent Adoptions of EU Directives in
Austria, 12 J. INT'L BANKING L. (1997).
105. See EC Treaty, supra note 103, at art. 169(2).
106. See Leidig, Austria Set to Take on Brussels Once Again, THE EUROPEAN, Oct. 23-
29, 1997, at 21, col. 1. For the decision to refer Austria to the European Court of Justice, see
European Commission, Fifteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community
Law- 1997, COM(1998) 317 final, 27 May 1998, 1998 O.J. (C 250)1 at 29. Note that the case
has still not been officially lodged before the Court.
107. See EU Takes Austria to Court Over Anonymous Savings Account, 13 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L REP. 476 (1997).
108. See supra note 21, at art. 3.
109. Council Act of July 26, 1995 drawing up the Convention based on article K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union on the Establishment of a European Police Office, 1995 O.J. (C 316)
1. The European Parliament's evaluation of EUROPOL is contained in EP Resolution of May
19, 1995, PARL. EUR. Doc. B4-0732/95, 1995 O.J. (C 151) 376.
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issues falling within the scope of the responsibility of justice/home affairs
ministries. The most successful of these arrangements has been the Trevi
Group. This entity was set up during the December 1985, Rome Summit
of the European Council and became operative in June 1986. The Trevi
Group's original terms of reference were to promote police cooperation
and exchange of information in relation to terrorist activities.
Even though justice and home affairs ministers from all Member
States participated in the Trevi Group, it operated outside the formal EC
structure. In effect, its decisions were not legally binding on Member
States, since they were not legislative acts of the European Community
(they rather took the form of gentleman's agreements) and, at the same
time, they were not open to judicial review by the European Court of
Justice. In its meeting in Paris, France in December 1989, the Trevi
Group adopted a declaration stating that its activities will extend to drug
trafficking and money laundering of narcotics proceeds, because these were
considered as areas of high priority."'
The important but not well documented work undertaken by the Trevi
Group was integrated in Title IV of the Treaty on European Union
(hereinafter "TEU")... providing for cooperation in the fields of justice and
home affairs (the so-called third pillar). More particularly, it formed part
of the Coordinating Committee of Article K.4. The European Drugs Unit
was established by the Trevi Ministers in June 1993, and became
operational in January 1994. 112 It was conceived as an entity to replace the
activities of the Trevi Group until EUROPOL was set up."' The European
Council meeting in Essen in December 1994, decided to widen its mandate
by including the following three criminal activities, which since the early
1990's have constituted the new areas of criminality in Europe: trafficking
in motor vehicles; trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances; illegal
immigration smuggling and associated money laundering operations.
Furthermore, it asked the Council to implement this action immediately by
appropriate legal instruments. 
114
Soon thereafter the EDU's legal basis was replaced by a Joint Action
based on Article K.3 TEU,' 15 which empowers the Council of Ministers to
110. See Benyon et al, Police Cooperation in Europe - An Investigation, 157 (Centre for
the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester, 1993).
111. See supra note 16.
112. Agreement of Ministers responsible for internal security matters, signed in
Copenhagen on June 2, 1993, Bull. Eur. Communities 6-1993, point 1.4.19; reproduced in Sweet
& Maxwell, Encyclopedia of European Union Law, §§ 130.0007 et seq.
113. Id.
114. See Bull. Eur. Communities 12-1994, point 1.26.
115. Council Joint Action 95/73/JHA concerning the European Drugs Unit adopted on the
basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, 1995 O.J. (L 62) 1, Bull. Eur.
Communities 3-1995, point 15.4; reproduced in Sweet & Maxwell, Encyclopedia of European
Union Law, §§ 130.0049 et seq.
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adopt joint action in all matters of common interest in the fields of justice
and home affairs. However, this only applies if the objectives of the
European Union can be better achieved in this way rather than by the
Member States acting individually. The areas of common interest are
enumerated exclusively in Article K. 1 TEU and include, inter alia, asylum,
immigration and fraud.
In Article K. 1 TEU the existence of EUROPOL was envisaged in the
context of "police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and
combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of
international crime in connection with the organization of a Union-wide
system for exchanging information within a European Police Office."116
Although this provision does not expressly lay down that such an entity is
to be set up, the Council of Ministers drew up the EUROPOL Convention
on the basis of the power conferred upon it under Article K.3(2)(c) to
adopt treaties in any of the areas of common interest mentioned in Article
K.1.1
7
Although the drawing up of the Convention had already been agreed
in principle by the European Council meeting in Lisbon in June 1992, it
met with considerable opposition which delayed its conclusion until June
21, 1996, when it was finally signed. 118 The EUROPOL Convention is
expected to enter into force on October 1, 1998, by which time it should
have been ratified by all 15 Member States. 19
EUROPOL's objective, as elaborated in Article 2(1) of the
Convention, is to promote the effectiveness and cooperation of the Member
States' competent authorities in preventing and combating terrorism,
narcotics trafficking and other serious international crimes. 1 ° However,
EUROPOL will assume jurisdiction only if there are factual indications
than an organized criminal structure is involved affecting two or more
Member States in such a way as to require a common approach by Member
States owing to the scale, significance and consequences of the offenses
concerned.
This objective is to be achieved progressively. According to Article
2(2) of the EUROPOL Convention, its initial terms of reference are to
prevent and fight narcotics trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Bull. Eur. Communities 6-1996, point 1.5. The Convention is based on the
Revised Draft of Oct. 25 1994, which has not been officially reproduced. This draft was the
object of a meticulous examination by the British House of Lords; see House of Lords, Select
Committee on the European Communities, Session 1994-95, 10th Report, EUROPOL, Apr. 25
1995, HL Paper 51.
119. See The European Commission (London Office), The Week in Europe, Feb. 5, 1998,
WE/5/98, at 1.
120. Bull. Eur. Communities 6-1996, supra note 118.
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radioactive substances, illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in human beings
and motor vehicle crime.' 2' Its areas of jurisdiction are identical with those
of EDU with the addition of illicit trade in human beings. By virtue of
Article 2(3), EUROPOL is also competent to deal with illegal activities to
launder the proceeds from these offenses. By specifically linking money
laundering with these crimes, the Convention acknowledges the fact that
the traditional patterns of crime have changed fundamentally and that it is
now imperative to address effectively at the Community level specific
manifestations of these offenses, such as the laundering of proceeds.
Since the EUROPOL Convention did not offer its own definition of
money laundering, it was to be expected that the definition contained in the
Money Laundering Directive would have been adopted. However, the
Convention expressly states that the term money laundering is understood
as meaning the criminal offenses listed in Article 6(1)-(3) of the Council of
Europe Convention on Laundering. ' The restrictive nature of the
definition contained in the Directive made it inadequate for inclusion in the
EUROPOL Convention, which opted for the quite extensive provisions of
the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering.
B. Relations with Central and Eastern European Countries
The question of whether the membership of the European Community
should expand to include the states of Central and Eastern Europe has
given rise to considerable controversy. During the Luxembourg Summit
Meeting (December 12-13, 1997), the European Community took the
political decision to proceed with enlargement with 11 candidate-states. 2
With the six countries which were chosen as the first group of states to be
considered for membership (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
and the Czech Republic), the negotiations were formally opened in
London, Britain on March 30, 1998.124 This decision was the culmination
of a long process, which commenced in the early 1990's, when the
European Community entered into association agreements with these
states. "z
121. On Dec. 4, 1997, the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agreed to extend the
EUROPOL's jurisdiction to include the collection and analysis of information on child
pornography; see Bull. Eur. Union 12-1997, point 1.4.9.
122. See supra note 43.
123. See Bull. Eur. Union 12-97, point 1.5.10.
124. With the remaining five states (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia)
the European Community formally opened the accession process; see The European Commission
(London Office), The Week in Europe, Apr. 2, 1998, WE/13/98, at 1.
125. See generally, Maresceau & Montagatti, The Relations Between the European Union
and Central and Eastern Europe: A LegalAppraisal, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1327 (1995).
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These instruments, commonly known as Europe Agreements, 26 have
aimed at facilitating their economies to reach the standard, which is
required for eventual European Community membership.' 27 One common
aspect of these Agreements is that they incorporate the following provision,
which imposes upon them a duty to become active in combating money
laundering:
1. The Parties agree on the necessity of making every effort
and cooperating in order to prevent the use of their financial
systems for laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in
general and drug offenses in particular;
2. Cooperation in this area shall include administrative and
technical assistance with the purpose of establishing suitable
standards against money laundering equivalent to those adopted by
the Community and international fora in this field, in particular
the Financial Action Task Force.
The essence of this provision, which appears as Article 85 in the
Europe Agreement with Poland, 2 ' as Article 86 in the Europe Agreements
with Hungary, 29 Slovakia 3 ' and the Czech Republic 3' and as Article 87 in
the Agreements with Bulgaria'3 2 and Romania,'33 is that the European
Community expects that these countries shall adopt legislation which
incorporates the Money Laundering Directive and the recommendations of
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The latter was conceived during
the 15th Economic Summit Meeting of the G-7 Group (Paris, July 1989),
as a body to promote international cooperation in preventing the utilization
126. The idea to proceed with the Conclusion of the Europe Agreements was launched by
the Commission in its Communication of Aug. 27, 1990 on the conclusion of association
agreements with countries of Central and Eastern Europe, COM(90) 398 final; Bull. Eur.
Communities 7/8-1990, point 1.4.5.
127. See GOWER, EC RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE in THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 283 (Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1993);
MARESCEAU, EUROPE AGREEMENTS: A NEW FORM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: LEGAL ADAPTATION TO THE MARKET ECONOMY 209 (Muller
Graf. 1993).
128. Signed in Brussels, Belgium on Dec. 16, 1991, 1993 O.J. (L 348) 2.
129. Signed in Brussels, Belgium on Dec. 16, 1991, 1993 O.J. (L 347) 2.
130. Signed in Luxembourg, on Oct. 4, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 359) 2.
131. Signed in Luxembourg on Oct. 4, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 360) 2.
132. Signed in Brussels, Belgium on Mar. 8, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 358) 3. See also, the
Europe Agreement with Slovenia, which was signed in Luxembourg on June 10, 1996, Bull.
Euro. Communities 6-1996, point 1.4.52. This Agreement has not been officially reproduced.
133. Signed in Brussels, Belgium on Feb. 1, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 357) 2.
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of the banking system and financial institutions for money operations. 34 Its
recommendations, which were adopted on February 7, 1990, and revised
on June 28, 1996,'3 have long been regarded as the minimum standards
that national anti-money laundering laws must observe.
Already a number of countries in the region have promulgated
comprehensive anti money laundering legislation: Hungary,1 the Slovak
Republic, 137 Slovenia, 138 the Czech Republic 139 Poland 14 and Lithuania. 141
On September 8, 1994, the European Community's Ministers for Justice
and Home Affairs met with their counterparts from Central and Eastern
Europe in Berlin, Germany to discuss even closer cooperation in the fight
against organized crime.142  They agreed to make full use of the relevant
provisions of the Europe Agreements and to focus their attention, apart
from drug trafficking, to illegal immigration networks, crime involving
radioactive and nuclear materials, motor vehicle theft and money
laundering of proceeds derived from such offenses. 43
There is no dispute that most Central and Eastern European countries
have made great advances in putting in place an effective framework for
combating money laundering. However, it should not escape one's
attention that these states were asked to change fundamentally the structure
of their economy and financial sector within a relatively short period of
time. This process has been plagued by the lack of adequate financing and
expertise, and by inexperience on how to resolve conflicts between existing
legislation and the adopted anti-money laundering statutes. These problems
have been highlighted in a recent report by the United States government,
134. See Magliveras, Defeating the Money Launderer - The International and European
Framework, J. Bus. L. 161, 166-67 (1992).
135. Reproduced in [1996] 35 I.L.M. 1293.
136. Act No. IX of 1994, published in Magyar Kazlony, No. 25. Mar. 8, 1994, at 797; it
introduced Article 303 of the Penal Code making money laundering a criminal offense.
137. Act on combat against the legalization of proceeds from particularly heavy and
specifically organized crime of Aug. 19, 1994, published in Zbierka Zakonov, No. 72, Sept. 17,
1994 at 249. It has been amended by the Act of Feb. 15, 1997, in force since July 1, 1997; see
Blaha, Money Laundering in the Czech Republic, 12 J. INT'L BANKING L. 35 (1997).
138. Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering of May 8, 1994, published in URADNI
LIST, No. 36, June 22, 1994, at 1474.
139. Act on certain measures against the legalization of proceeds from criminal activities
of Feb. 15, 1996, published in Sbirka Zakonu, No. 19, Mar. 30, 1996, at 61.
140. Article 5 of the Act on the protection of financial transactions of Oct. 12, 1994,
published in Dziennik Ustaw, 1994, No. 126, at 615; see Weigend, Geldwaesche im polnischen
Strafrecht, 108 ZEISCHRIFT FUER DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 416 (1996).
141. Law on Prevention of Money Laundering of June 19, 1997, in force since July 1,
1997, published in Valstybes Zinios, No. 64, 1502.
142. See Bull. Eur. Communities 9-1994, point 1.4.1.
143. Id.
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which has recorded the request by Hungary and Poland (the region's most
important economies). The report states that the United States and the
European Community provide increased training and financial support to
help their banking institutions and law enforcement agencies to implement
more strenuous anti-money laundering controls.'"
Finally, it should be noted that the European Community is taking
every opportunity to press the candidate-states of Eastern and Central
Europe to deal with organized crime in an effective manner. Thus, when
in March 1998, the London negotiations on European Community
membership were inaugurated, 45 the European Community and the eleven
applicant states agreed to establish the European Conference as a high level
forum for discussing and implementing policy issues relating to the
European Community's enlargement.'" Combating transnational organized
crime was one of the five priority areas on which the European Conference
will concentrate. 47
C. The Extradition Convention (The Convention)
Perceived as a top priority in improving judicial cooperation, 4" the
Extradition Convention [hereinafter "Convention"] relating to Extradition
between Member States of the European Union was adopted on September
27, 1996."49 Building upon two relevant Conventions adopted under the
auspices of the Council of Europe, namely the European Convention on
Extradition'" and the European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, '5' it aims at accelerating extradition between Member States and
at reducing the number of cases where extradition might be refused. In
facilitating the latter goal, the Convention breaks away for the traditional
rule of double criminality. 152
144. United States General Accounting Office, Money Laundering: A Framework for
Understanding United States Efforts Overseas (May 1996).
145. See supra note 124.
146. See The European Commission (London Office), The Week in Europe, Mar. 19,
1998, WE/ 11/98, at 2.
147. Id.
148. See Council Resolution of Oct. 14, 1996 laying down the priorities for cooperation in
the fields of justice and home affairs for the period from July 1, 1996 to June 30, 1998, 1996 O.J.
(C 319) 1; Bull. Eur. Union 10-1996, point 1.5.1.
149. 1996 O.J. (C 313) 12; Bull. Eur. Communities 9-1996, point 1.5.3. The
Explanatory Memorandum to the Convention is published in 1996 O.J. (C 374) 4. This
instrument should not confused with the EU Convention on Simplified Extradition Procedure,
1995 O.J. (C 78) 2; Bull. Eur. Union 3-1995, point 1.5.3.
150. See supra note 8.
151. Signed in Strasbourg, France on Jan. 27, 1977, in force since Aug. 4, 1978, E.T.S.
90, 1137 U.N.T.S. 93.
152. See supra note 26.
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Article 3(1) of the Convention stipulates that extradition must be
granted when requested in relation to any offense in the field of drug
trafficking and other forms of organized crime, which is punishable in the
requesting state by penalty of deprivation of liberty for more than twelve
months. The innovative aspect of the Convention is that the requested state
must observe the extradition request, even if its domestic law does not
stipulate that the same facts and circumstances constitute a criminal
offense. In other words, the rule of double criminality does not apply.
Since laundering of drug proceeds is a crime directly associated with
trafficking in narcotics, the Convention undoubtedly facilitates the
extradition of money launderers. However, there is one consideration,
which will significantly restrict the amnbit of this provision: Article 3(3)
allows signatory parties to declare that they reserve the right not to apply
Article 3(1) or to apply it under certain conditions.
Whether the Extradition Convention will ever enter into force is open
to speculation, since it requires the prior ratification by all fifteen Member
States. Some of its provisions are extremely far reaching and may give
rise to problems of a constitutional nature. For example, Article 8(1) lays
down the rule that extradition may not be refused on the ground that the
prosecution or punishment of the individual whose extradition is sought
would be barred under the law of the requested Member State.5 3 Finally,
it should be noted that this Convention is not a comprehensive extradition
treaty and does not seek to replace the European Convention on Extradition
as between the Member States.5 4 In effect, the preamble makes it clear
that the provisions of the 1957 Treaty remain applicable for all matters not
covered by it.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As G. Giacomelli, the Executive Director of the United Nations
International Drug Control Program, noted the unprecedented advances in
the areas of technology and communications together and the fact that the
banking sector is becoming more and more globalized have resulted in
making money laundering an extremely sophisticated crime."' The
European Community, as a regional organization whose combined
153. See supra note 8. It would appear that this provision contradicts Article 10 of the
Council of Europe Convention on Extradition. Stipulating that extradition will not be granted
when the person claimed has, according to the law of either the requesting or the requested state,
become immune by reason of lapse of time from prosecution or punishment.
154. Note that Article 28(2) of the Council of Europe Convention on Extradition, supra
note 8, expressly allows signatory parties to conclude between them multilateral agreements in
order to supplement the provisions of this Convention or to facilitate the application of its
principles.
155. Giocomelli, Take the Profit out of the Crime by Policing the Money Laundries, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Dec. 4, 1996, at 10.
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membership controls the largest banking sector in the world, is particularly
vulnerable to be exploited by the internationally organized money
launderers, whose vast proceeds exceed the annual gross national product
of the smaller Member States.
The European Community has not regarded money laundering as
simply a criminal offense. From the very beginning its efforts
concentrated in making the laundering of illegal proceeds a crime and in
adopting a series of measures to protect the banking and financial sectors
from the sophisticated methods used by money launderers. However, it
was soon realized that by concentrating on the Member States' banking and
financial sectors, the European Community was not addressing the panacea
of money laundering effectively, because launderers can very easily
transfer their operations in less regulated systems. Therefore, the
European Community, by exercising the considerable influence it enjoys,
has attempted to persuade third countries to become seriously involved in
the fight against money laundering.'56
Parallel to these efforts, the European Community has strived to
improve its own framework. The conclusion of the EUROPOL
Convention and the Treaty on Extradition will undoubtedly contribute in
materializing this aim. Furthermore, the application of the Money
Laundering Directive has already made apparent its shortcomings,
especially in relation to its ambit. In June 1996, the European Parliament
regarded that the system for fighting money laundering was inadequate and
called upon the Community to revise urgently the provisions of the Money
Laundering Directive and, in particular, to extend its scope to cover all
conceivable natural and legal persons involved in financial transactions.' 57
It has been reported that the Council of Ministers is considering
broadening both the list of predicate offenses and the compulsory reporting
of suspected transactions to gambling, prostitution and building
industries.158 However, there are no clear indications that an amendment is
imminent. Any amendment of the Money Laundering Directive would be a
very delicate exercise, because its implementation in the domestic laws of
the Member States has led to considerable disparities among them.
Perhaps it is high time to realize that whether the fight against money
laundering will be won or lost does not any longer depend so much on
further European Community initiatives but on how committed Member
States are in applying, observing and safeguarding the existing framework.
156. In this respect, one should mention Council Regulation 2046/97 of Oct. 13, 1997 on
North-South Cooperation in the Campaign against Drugs and Drug Addiction, 1997 O.J. (L 287)
1; Bull. Eur. Union 10-1997, point 1.3.39.
157. See Eur. Parl. Resol. of June 21, 1996, Eur. Parl. Doc. A4-0187196, 1996 O.J. (C
198) 245.
158. See den Boer, Police Cooperation in the TEU: Tiger in a Trojan Horse? 32
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 555, 574-75 (1995).
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Despite the spectacular integration that the European Community has
achieved in the banking and financial sectors, Member States still retain
peculiarities in these areas, as the dispute regarding Austria's anonymous
savings accounts has characteristically shown.
